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SUMMARY
The Space Station Freedom Proqram requires
leakage currents to be limited to less than human
perception level, which NASA presently defines as
5 mA for dc. This paper traces the origin of this
value and surveys the literature for other dc percep-
tion threshold standards. It shows that while many
varying standards exist, very little experimental
data i_ available to support them.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
An important aspect of
the shock hazard on Space
Station Freedom (SSF) is the
hazard associated with
excessive leakage current.
For the purpose of this
discussion, we define two
kinds of leakage current:
Chassis Leakage Current is any
current which flows through
the chassis in the absence of
a faulted condition.
Connector LeakageCurrent is
current that flows through a
connector in the "power-off"
state when a circuit is
completed at the connector.
Excessive chassis leakage
current creates a shock hazard
whenever a crewperson touches
the energized chassis with one
part of the body and a
grounded surface with another
part, completing the circuit.
This can happen during almost
any operation. Excessive
connector leakage current can
shock a crewperson who is
performing maintenance on a
powered-down ORU (Orbital
Replacement Unit). He or she
must first break the
connection, which may cause an
arc; and afterwards he or she
may inadvertently touch the
exposed connector with one
hand while contacting grounded
chassis with another body part
(most likely a hand or
foothold), completing the
circuit.
Both leakage currents
create a more severe hazard on
SSF than on past manned
programs, due to the Station's
higher currents and voltages,
and its requirement for on-
orbit maintenance.
The Remote Power
Controllers (RPCs) on the NSTS
Orbiter are required to leak
no more than one ten
thousandth of their rated
current. Thus the 20 A RPCs
leak no more than 2 mA and the
10 A RPCs leak no more than 1
mA. The Space Station design
includes RPCs rated at 50 A
and 25 A.
Leakage currents are
almost always present to some
degree in electrical
equipment. System designers
can control the resultant
shock hazard by several
means I. Before they can do
this, however, SSFP System
Safety must specify the
maximum amount of current to
which a crewperson can be
safely exposed: this is
tantamount to specifying the
perception level of direct
current and is the purpose of
this paper.
2.0 THE PERCEPTION LEVEL OF
DIRECT CURRENT
The "perception level" of
current at a given frequency
is the level at which a human
placed in the circuit can just
begin to sense current.
Current of this magnitude is
far too small to cause any
physical damage, or even pain,
but it may be enough to
surprise an individual and
cause him or her to jerk away,
leading to injury and/or
damaging equipment. This is
particularly true in the on-
orbit environment, where
rapid, jerky movements can
cause injuries due to impact
and particularly since
workspace is often somewhat
confined.
Near the perception
level, lower frequency (on the
order of 60 - 400 hz)
alternating current produces a
slight tingling sensation
which is continuous for the
duration of contact.
Perception level direct
current manifests itself as a
slight "kick" when contact is
made and another when contact
is broken. In between the two
"kicks" there may be a small
sensation of warmth.
2.1 SSFP Requirements
Few people have undergone
electric shock in a situation
where an accurate measurement
of the current magnitude
through their body was
available. Therefore most
discussions of the minimum dc
perception level proceed
without much "feel" for what
the numbers imply. How many
people could distinguish i mA
dc from 2 mA dc? 3 from 4?
etc.
The best reference within
NASA documentation is NASA-
STD-3000, Man Systems
In_egratign Requirements,
November 1986. Volume IV of
this document is baselined for
space station 2. Volume IV,
section 6.4.3, "Electrical
Hazards Design Requirements",
references "Figure 6.4.3-1" of
Volume 1, which is reproduced
in this paper as figure 1.
This figure shows a number of
constant current lines and
states their effects on humans
for 60 hz currents.
"Perception threshold" is
given as 1 mA. "Note 2",
after stating that 60 hz is
about the worst possible
current for shock, gives
scaling factors for
normalizing the 60 hz effects
to currents of different
frequencies. For 0 hz (direct
current), the scaling factor
is 0.2, and hence the 1 mA
perception current at 60 hz
translates into a 5 mA
perception current for dc.
There are some who
believe that this number is
far too high - that currents
below 5 mA dc can be felt and
could present a hazard.
Indeed, in a recent draft
version of NASA-STD-3000 Rev
A, 100 microamperes (0.1 mA)
is proposed for maximum
leakage current! Because
proposed values vary so
widely, and because so few
people-have a "feel" for
perception current, it is
important to investigate the
sources of "Figure 6.4.3-1"
and "Note 2" in NASA-STD-3000,
and assess their applicability
to the Space Station Freedom
Program.
2.2 Sources of "Figure
6.4.3-1" and "Note 2"
2.2.1 NASA-CR-1205
Figure 2 of this paper
illustrates the origins of
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Figure I. NASA-STD-3000, Vol. 1, "Figure 6.4.3-1", including "Note 2".
NASA-STD-3000 "Figure 6.4.3-1"
and "Note 2". They are taken
directly from NASA-CR-1205,
Compendi._m 9f Human _eep0nses
to the AerosPace Envir0nm_n_,
by E. M. Roth 3. NASA-CR-I_05
is a large compendium of
reports by various authorities
on different medical aspects
of space flight compiled for
NASA in 1968. Section 5, by
Finkelstein & Roth, deals with
the effects of electricity on
humans. It contains a small
section on "Frequency Factors"
(p. 5-11) which puts forth
several statements comparing
the effects of direct current
and alternating current. They
are listed here, with their
sources:
"Other factors equal,
alternating current is
approximately three times
more injurious than
direct current."
J. A., Neurologic
Manifestations of
- Aita,
DALZIEL, C. F.
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Figure 2. Origin of NASA-STD-3000, Vol I, "Figure 6.4.3-1" and "Note
2". "Figure 6.4.3-I" and "Note 2" did not appear in the same paper
until NASA-CR-1205, and were not combined until NASA-STD-3000.
Electrcial Injury,
_ebraska State Medical
JQurnal, 50: 530-533, Oct
1965.
"The median threshold of
sensation for direct
current of over 100 adult
men and women is 1.43
milliamperes as compared
to 1.0 for 60 Hz AC." -
Kouwenhoven, W.B., Johns
Hopkins University,
Baltimore, MD, personal
communication on
unpublished data, 1968.
and
"It appears that humans
are about five times as
sensitive to 60 to 400 Hz
as to DC, but more
studies are in progress
on this point." -
Kouwenhoven, W.B., Johns
Hopkins University,
Baltimore, MD, personal
communication on
unpublished data, 1968.
Statement one tells us
that for inSurv, 60 hz is
three times worse than dc.
Statement two says that for
perception, people are 1.43
times as sensitive to 60 hz as
they are to dc. But statement
three seems to contradict the
first two .... it says that
people are FIVE TIMES as
sensitive to 60 hz as they are
to dc, without specifying
whether this pertains to
mg__n_%i_n, injury, or both!
The "five times as sensitive"
scaling factor for dc is
reflected in NASA-CR-1205
table 5-6, which eventually
became "Note 2" of NASA-STD-
3000.
A check on the sources
reveals that Kouwenhoven
(cited in statements 2 and 3)
was also one of the reviewers
of Section 5 of NASA-CR-1205.
We do not know whether
Kouwenhoven's "unpublished
data" was ever published. It
seems strange that the same
source would give both "1.43
mA as compared to 1.0" AND
"five times as sensitive".
Statement 3, "five times as
sensitive", could well be
cited incorrectly, because the
same sentence, as well as the
table which eventually became
"Note 2", appear in ISA-MONO-
110 by R. H. Lee.
One question stands out:
Why did NASA choose to
incorporate the "five times as
sensitive" statement into
NASA-STD-3000 while ignoring
the "three times more
injurious" and "1.43 mA as
compared to 1.0" statements?
2.2.2 ISA-MONO-110
NASA-STD-3000 "Fig 6.4.3-
i" and "Note 2" cite NASA-CR-
1205. This, in turn, cites
Instrument Society of America
Monograph 110 (ISA-MONO-110),
_Dman Electrical Saf%tv, by
R.H. Lee 4. Lee, a Senior
Electrical Engineer from
DuPont, wrote this "guideline"
type of article in 1965.
Sadly, it contain@ no
citation_ or references 5. It
does provide the following on
the figure, which corresponds
to "Figure 6.4.3-1" of NASA-
STD-3000:
"The results are based on
tests on guinea pigs,
then dogs, then sheep,
then calves."
but it does not reference a
specific study.
This statement, and a
note 6 in NASA-CR-1205, imply
that Lee got his data from
three sources:
- Kouwenhoven, W. B., &
Milnor, W. R., Field
Treatment Qf Electric
Shock Cases - 1, 1957;
- Morse, A.R., discussion
section of the above
Kouwenhoven & Milnor
article, 1957;
and
- Dalziel, C. F.,
Deleterious Effects of
Human Shock, 1962;
It is not clear, then,
that both "Figure 6.4.3-1" and
"Note 2" of NASA-STD-3000 came
from the same original source.
Though there are no clues
as to the origin of "Note 2",
the next three subsections
examine the sources of "Figure
6.4.3-1".
2.2.2.1 Kouwenhoven & Milnor
W. B. Kouwenhoven and W.
R. Milnor, MD, ran a number of
experiments at Johns Hopkins
University in the 1950s. The
paper referenced by Lee,
Treatment of Electric Sho_
C_S - _, is primarily
concerned with the treatment
of cardiac fibrillation, a
lethal condition induced by
high currents in which the
heart stops beating and
flutters uselessly.
Fibrillating currents begin at
around 100 mA, and experiments
An this range are done
exclusively on animals.
Hence, there is no data in
this paper on dc perception
current.
Fiel_ Treatment Qf
Electric Sh_ck Cas_$ - 1 was
published in 1957 by the AIEE
Safety Committee. It prompted
a response from A. R. Morse of
the National Research Council
of Canada. It is in this
discussion that the first
version of "Figure 6.4.3-1" of
NASA-STD-3000 appears.
2.2.2.2 Morse
A. R. Morse of the NRCC
responded to Kouwenhoven and
Milnor's paper by preparing a
chart, shown in figure 3 of
this paper _. Two observations
are important: (1) the data
for this _hart is for 60 hz
with no mention of other
frequencies or dc, that is, it
did not show up in the same
paper as "Note 2" until ISA-
MON0-110, and was not combined
with "Note 2" until NASA-CR-
1205; (2) the data for
different levels (perception,
fibrillation, etc) were
obtained through several
different sources,
specifically Dalziel,
Kouwenhoven & Milnor,
Maclachlan, and Massagolia.
We believe the
"perception" line in this
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Figure 3. "The 60 cycle
shock hazard to adult males",
from A. R. Morse.
figure came from a series of
experiments run by Charles F
Dalziel, since the Kouwenhoven
& Milnor source does not
discuss perception currents,
the Maclachlan source cited is
+
a summary of field notes on
electric shock, and the
Massagolia source deals with
the hazards of open-circuited
current transformers.
We have come, then, to
the original source of the
perception current line in
"Figu+re 6.4.3-i". Like most
investigators of electric
shock, we are ultimately led
back to the experiments of Dr.
Charles F. Dalziel s.
2.2.2.3 Dalziel
Dalziel performed a
number of experiments on live
humans from the late 1930s to
the mid 1950s, mostly
centering around perception
and let-go levels.
Experiments since that time
have all been with animals or
cadavers, presumably for legal
or insurance reasons 9. A
search through the literature
reveals that almost all
quantitative data on
perception and let-go current
can be traced back to
Dalziel's experiments.
Perception tests for 60
hz were run on 167 healthy,
young men - mostly college
students. The 60 hz data was
collected in three separate
test series run several years
apart, with different subjects
and wires of different
sizes Z°. Nonetheless, data
from all three test series
form a normal distribution,
shown in figure 4 of this
paper zl. The median z2 value
for this curve is 1.086 mA,
which is probably the reason
Morse gave 1 mA as the
"perception level" in his
chart (fig 3 of this paper),
which eventually evolved into
the perception line of "Figure
6.4.3-1".
There was another test,
however - this one
specifically for
curren_ perception. In 1940,
at the University of
California, Berkeley, Dalziel
tested the dc perception level
of 115 healthy, young men.
The subjects rested each hand
lightly on a no. 7 copper
wire. Current was controlled
by a potentiometer and
energized from batteries 13.
The results are shown in
figure 5 of this paper 14.
Again the curve follows a
normal distribution and this
time the median value is 5.2
mA. This could be the source
of Lee's "Relative Effect of
Frequencies on perception and
paralysis", which evolved into
"Note 2". A search through
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the literature has revealed no
other original test data on
human perception of direct
current.
2.3 Other Standards &
RequiremGnts
There are few standards
that do not reference Dalziel.
Some which were located in the
course of this investigation
are given here. They are not
baselined for the Space
Station, and we did not make
an effort to trace their
sources.
1. European Space Agency
(ESA). At the SSFP Work
Package Four/ESA Technical
Interchange Meeting in
October, 1990, Mr. Bernhard
9
Glaubitz presented 2 mA as the
current requirement being
considered by ESA for the
Columbus Attached Pressurized
Module and Man Tended Free
Flyer programs. This is the
standard being considered by
the European Community nations
for the unified electric code
they are preparing for 1992.
2. IEC 479-1. The
International Electrotechnical
Commission published this
report, titled f_[_Ju_q_
Current Passing Thro_uh the
Human Body, in 1984. Chapter
3, paragraph 4.1 states:
"Under conditions comparable
to those applied in studies
with a.c., the threshold of
perception was found to be
about 2 mA." The specific
studies are not named but
reference is made to a work by
Antoni & Biegelmeier 15.
3. MIL-STD-454. This
standard, titled S_andard
_n_ral Requirements for
Electroni_ Equipment, is
referenced in figure 6.4.2-1
of NASA-STD-3000. Section 5,
table 1-I, gives a range of 0
to 4 mA as the "perception"
region, and 4 to 15 mA as the
"surprise" region for direct
current. The section is
labeled "Information and
guidance only", and no source
for the numbers is cited.
4. AAMI Electromedical
Standards. The Association
for the Advancement of Medical
Instrumentation (AAMI), in
their AAMI Safety S_andard fQr
Electromedical Apparatus, Saf_
Current Limits, April, 1974,
limits leakage currents to 100
microamperes (100 uA) for
equipment likely to contact
hospital patients, and 10 uA
for equipment that
deliberately applies current
to the patient. These
standards are very tight due
to the fact that sick people
often have low sensitivity to
and lower tolerance of
electric current. Limiting
leakage current to 100 uA is
very difficult in a space
system, especially in power
conditioning and switching
equipment _ .
The Air Force and Army
adopted this standard for
their AF Regulation 160-3,
Prevention of El_ctrical Shock
_azard$ iD Hospi_al_.
5. ANSI C101.I-1973.
This ANSI standard, Am@rican
National Standard for Leakaue
Current fQr Appliances,
applies to chassis leakage
current for consumer
appliances. This document
gives a very specific test
setup. It uses Dalziel's
data _ and "normalizes" the
perception curve to 0.5 mA at
60 hz, probably to introduce a
safety factor.
3.0 SUMMARY
It is not absolutely
provable without references
from Lee, but the evidence
above indicates that the
following might be the source
of NASA's 5 mAdc leakage
current requirement. All
references to figures apply to
the figures in this paper.
]0
!940 - 1956: Dalziel runs
perception experiments on
humans. Median values: 1.086
mA for 60 hz (fig 5) and 5.2
mA for dc (fig 5).
1957: Morse creates chart,
"The 60 cycle electric shock
hazard to adult males" (fig
4), from several sources.
Perception line at 1 mA comes
from Dalziel's chart (fig 5).
196_: Lee includes modified
version of Morse's chart in
ISA-MONO-II0. Perception
threshold for ac still at 1
mA. Elsewhere in same
publication Lee presents
table, "Relative effects of
frequencies", which states
that dc's effect is 0.2 times
that of 60 hz - possibly based
on Dalziel's dc perception
level (fig 5).
1968: Finkelstein & Roth
reproduce Lee's chart and
Lee's table $eparatel_ in
NASA-CR-1205; quote Lee's
statement that humans are 5
times as sensitive to 60 hz as
to dc, but also include
another statement that dc
perception = 1.43 mA.
1986: NASA-STD-3000, Volume
i, reproduces Lee's chart as
"Figure 6.4.3-1" (fig I) and
includes Lee's table as "Note
2" to the chart. The
perception threshold in
"Figure 6.4.3-1" and "Note 2"
become baselined requirements
for Space Station.
5 mAbecomes the requirement
for maximum safe leakage
current.
4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
Our investigation of
NASA's 5 mA dc leakage current
requirement has shown that
although many varying dc
perception threshold standards
exist, very little data which
supports these standards is
readily available.
Implementing the following two
recommendations would clarify
the requirement and increase
its credibility.
Recommendation I: State the
leakage current requirement
directly, and put "Figure
6.4.3-1" in the reference
section.
Paragraph 6.4.3.a of
NASA-STD-3000 states that
"Crewmembers shall not be
exposed to voltages and
currents that exceed the
'PERCEPTION THRESHOLD' line in
figure 6.4.3-1, using the
frequency normalization
factors given in Note 2 of the
figure."
If the requirement is
only concerned with perception
level, why include the whole
chart, with all its data on
let-go, fibrillation, burning,
etc, in the requirements
section? Additionally, the
chart only gives median values
and does not include any
safety factors. It only
summarizes information, and
therefore belongs in section
6.4.2, Electrical Hazards
Desiqn Considerations.
Separate requirements for the
different frequencies should
be stated in Section 6.4.3,
El_ctrical Hazar_ De$iqn
_=_4D9___. This section
11
should also give a means of
verification, including the
size of the resistor used in
the test setup. 500 ohms is
traditionally assumed to be
the worst case human
resistance - this simulates a
person with broken skin.
Recommendation 2: Consider
repeating Dalziel's test.
While Dalziel's work is
still widely accepted after
four decades, some have
questioned it on the grounds
that it has never been
replicated in an independent
laboratory - a basic criterion
for complete acceptance of
experimental research by the
scientific community. Few, if
any, people have a "feel" for
the perception current
numbers, including those
people who are responsible for
setting a safe standard within
NASA.
While let-go testing on
humans might introduce an
unacceptable safety risk by
today's standards, perception
testing by definition involves
extremely low current levels
and does not have to include
the heart or other vital
organs in the current path.
NASA's Man Systems
organization might consider
repeating Daiziel's test in a
safe, controlled environment.
Since there is really no pain
involved at these levels,
astronauts, design engineers,
and safety engineers
responsible for developing a
reasonable standard could use
such a test as an opportunity
to enhance the quality of
their discussions.
More importantly, NASA
could test the perception
level of populations other
than young, healthy males.
Dalziel predicted, for
example, that women's
perception current level would
be significantly lower than
that of men but never actually
tested it.
The medical personnel
within the Man Systems
organization might begin by
investigating the legality of
such a test.
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1. For example, the shock hazard due to connector leakage current
can be controlled by placing a mechanical relay in series with the
connector, shunting leakage current with a bleeder resistor, or
making the connector highly inaccessible. Chassis leakage current
can be controlled by shielding leaky components or placing leaky
components away from structure.
2. SSP 30000, Space Station Program DefinitiQn and Requirements,
Se_i0n 3: Space Station Systems Requirements, Revision I,
Paragraph 3.2.10. NASA SSFPO, November 1989.
3. Roth, E. M., NASA-CR-1205, o_endiDm _f Human Responses to the
Aerospace Environment: V01 _, Section 5, figure 5-3 and table 5-
6. Lovelace Foundation for Med Ed & Research, NASA, November 1968.
4. Lee, R. H., ISA-MON0-110, Human Electrical Safety, Instrument
Society of America, Pittsburgh, 1965, figure 2 and sheet 3, table
III.
5. This was confirmed by Victoria Fletcher, Reprints Administrator
of the ISA.
6. Roth, figure 5-3.
7. Morse, A. R. Discussion Section of "Field Treatment of Electric
Shock Cases - I" by Kouwenhoven & Milnor, AIEE Transactions, p_ _,
76: 85-86, AIEE 1957.
8. Banks, Robert S., An Assessment of the 5-mA 60-hz Contact
Current Safety Level, IEEE pQwer Engineering Society, 84 WM 036-0,
February 1984.
9. ibid., p. 4.
i0. Dalziel, Charles F., The Threshold of Perception Currents,
AIEE Transactions, 73: 990-996, August 1954.
11. ibid., figure 1.
12. Since the data are nearly a normal distribution, we use "mean"
and "median" interchangeably.
13. Dalziel, p.993.
14. ibid., figure 5.
15. Antoni, H., and Biegelmeier, G.: Ueber die Wirkungen yon
Gleichstrom auf den Menschen, E und M, Vol 96 (1979), No. 2, p.71.
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16. Conversation with Mr. Sina Javidi, Systems Integration Branch
Chief, Space Station Directorate, Lewis Research Center. October,
1990.
17. Footnote #2, page 7 of ANSI C101.1-1973.
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